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 1 
Abstract 
 
The intention of this document is to describe the role of decision support systems and 
decision support models in multi-risk assessment. We do not address the entire literature 
and all developments in this area, but focus on the way risk assessment is planned to be 
implemented in the European Union. Here we identify the needs for decision support 
models and suggest practical approaches that have the ability of being tested in one or 
several test areas of MATRIX and have potential use (to be explored in MATRIX WP8) for 
the European risk mapping process. 
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 5 
1 Introduction  
 
We start with definitions for decision support systems (DSS) and decision models (DM) in 
chapter 2. Whereas DSS is specified as an information system for the support of 
decisions, DM is characterized as a methodology or system that allows for the selection of 
decisions, usually from a discrete set of alternatives. The purpose of risk assessment, as a 
result of risk mapping, is not to take decisions but rather to show and display the role of 
different risks with regards to their frequency and severity. However, there are decisions to 
be made in the risk assessment process when ranking different loss categories. Thus, risk 
assessment requires DSS and components of DM. DMs are even, more valuable in the 
risk management process, as they target decisions rather than assessment. 
 
Chapter 3 refers to a selection of methods applied in the literature and in European 
projects. In chapter 4, the European risk assessment process is briefly described. Its 
PHWKRGRORJLFDO EDVLV LV GHVFULEHG LQ WKH &RPPLVVLRQ 6WDII :RUNLQJ 3DSHU ³5LVN
$VVHVVPHQW DQG 0DSSLQJ *XLGHOLQH IRU 'LVDVWHU 0DQDJHPHQW´ %UXVVHOV 
SEC (2010) 1626 Final). A possible methodology has been developed by the Federal 
Office of Civil Protection and Disaster Assistance (BBK, 2010) in Germany and is 
described in chapter 5. For any relevant risk, a set of scenarios should be designed. The 
frequency of the event and the severity of its impact will populate the risk matrix. The 
severity is expressed by an indicator variable that combines the severity of losses from five 
components: population, economy, ecology, infrastructure and intangible losses. As these 
losses can only be partially characterized in monetary terms, it is obvious that a 
methodology and scheme for ranking is essential. The development of this ranking 
scheme in a stakeholder process is the focus of the suggested decision support tool that 
we propose to develop and apply in the test cases. 
 
Chapter 6 discusses some of the basic features of Multi-Attribute Value Theory (MAVT), 
which is essential to understanding chapter 7, which discusses the decision process and 
its underlying methodology for the ranking of losses in the risk assessment approach. 
Chapter 8 provides a summary of this study. 
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2 General aspects of DSS and DM  
 
A decision support system (DSS) is a computer-based information system that supports 
organizational decision-making activities (Marakas 1999). It consists of at least three 
components: database, model(s) including user criteria, and a user interface. It helps to 
make informed (utilizing the database) and formal (utilizing the model) decisions. 
 
A Decision Model (DM) represents the logic of a process models logic based on the 
inherent structure of that logic, eliminating style and other subjective preferences, ensuring 
a consistent and stable representation (von Halle & Goldberg 2009). DMs include a 
formulation stage, an evaluation stage and an appraisal stage. Whereas evaluation 
focuses on the algorithmic aspect of DM, the appraisal stage emphasizes the 
communication of DM by looking into the implications, possible alternatives, and 
sensitivities.  
 
Decision models can be classified according to a number of criteria (Silver 1991; Sprague 
& Watson 1993): 
 
A:  The number of objectives 
A1:  Decision models with one objective 
A2:  Decision models with several (multi-) objectives 
 
B:  With regards to the level of information available to the decision maker, three 
categories can be distinguished: 
B1:  The environment within which the decision is to be taken is very well known so that a 
high level of knowledge and security in terms of the consequences dominates; 
deterministic models are appropriate. 
B2: Situations that include risks and several possible outcomes and consequences of the 
decision are conceivable, outcomes depend on unforeseeable circumstances, but 
can be associated with probabilities so that probabilistic approaches are generally 
appropriate. 
B3:  High levels of uncertainty prevail; possible outcomes are not fully clear and cannot 
easily be associated with probabilities. 
 
C:  Temporal interdependencies of decisions may be distinguished by:  
C1:  static models 
C2:  dynamic models. 
 
D:  From the point of view of the decision maker, distinctions are usually drawn between 
individuals and institutions or groups. 
D1:  When the decision maker interacts with an individual, an understanding of the 
LQGLYLGXDO¶V SHUFHSWLRQ RI D FHUWDLQ HQYLURQPHQW WKH possible decisions and their 
potential implications are of high relevance. 
D2:  When the decision maker interacts with a group or institution, group dynamic aspects 
and consensus seeking processes and methodologies become relevant.  
 
With regard to the risk mapping process (further elaborated in chapters 4 and 5) which is 
based on scenarios associated with a frequency and a severity of loss (for population, 
economy, ecology, infrastructure, intangibles), the requirements include information 
systems, and thus a classical DSS, which may be specific to the hazard types and risks 
treated. The ranking of risks, based on the severity of losses in various sectors 
(population, economy, ecology, infrastructure, and intangible losses) requires a DM that 
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allows stakeholders to develop this ranking in a rational and transparent way. As the risk 
mapping and assessment process deals primarily with the ranking of what risk and losses 
are of a higher or lower relevance, only a few of the listed criteria need to be considered. 
However, there is no DM required that selects the best alternative from a set of 
possibilities. Decisions have generally multiple objectives (A2). Very frequently, high levels 
of uncertainty prevail. Although dynamic risk models with temporal variations of 
vulnerability and exposure and/or temporal changes in the hazards ± for instance, driven 
by climate change ± are desirable, the current risk mapping scheme foreseen for Europe is 
rather static (C1). The national and/or regional scale of the assessment procedure also 
requires the involvement of many institutions (D2).  
 
As multiple objectives and criteria are relevant in risk assessment, these aspects require 
specific consideration. Transparent and coherent support for the solution of complex 
decision situations, including facilitation and communication between involved 
stakeholders, is the target of Multi-Criteria Decision Analysis (MCDA). An alternative 
approach is known as Cost-Benefit Analysis (CBA), which is frequently used for the 
quantitative evaluation of decisions related to risk (French 1986, 1996, 2003). CBA 
requires the expression of all benefits and disadvantages of the decision process in 
monetary terms and the decision follows from a comparison of costs and benefits. Thus, 
CBA is only applicable if all relevant items can be expressed in monetary terms. However, 
risk assessment often involves non-monetary items. If assets such as the environment, 
security, cultural heritage and other intangibles, which cannot readily be expressed in 
monetary terms, are important, CBA is difficult if not impossible to apply and MCDA is the 
preferred approach. The developers of MCDA consider the fact that the subjectivity in 
decision making is explicitly and deliberately included, and provides a clear advantage as 
long as transparency and traceability of the analysis is guaranteed. In addition, by 
providing a sound framework for sensitivity analysis, MCDA offers valuable support for 
consensus finding within decision-making groups. These items will be further explored in 
chapter 6. 
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3 Some decision support models in current use  
 
As the main purpose of this paper is the design of the methodology for developing a 
ranking scheme for the societal impact of a particular scenario, we do not attempt to 
provide a comprehensive overview on available decision support models.  
 
A number of information systems have been developed for specific types of disasters. 
HAZUS (Hazard US)1 was designed to use state-of-the-art geographic information system 
software to map and display hazard data and the results of damage to building 
infrastructure and the associated economic loss estimates in the United States. It has 
been commissioned by the US Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), which is 
part of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS). It allows users to estimate the 
impact of hurricanes, wind, floods and earthquakes on populations. It applies a 
standardized loss estimate in risk assessment methodology which is widely used in other 
countries, e.g. in Turkey and Taiwan.  
 
ORTIS (Operational Risk Management Tool and Information System)2 is a software tool 
specifically developed to support the risk management process on the scale of 
communities for Austria it refers to the risk matrix approach, where a large set of GIS-
based maps and other information can be structured into ORTIS. It can also be used as a 
knowledge management database and finds wide applications in many communities in 
Austria. This is a commercial tool.  
 
During the FP6 ARMONIA (applied multi-risk mapping of natural hazard for impact 
assessment) project, decision support software based on GIS data called Multi-Risk Land 
Use Management Support System (MURLMSS) was designed and developed. This 
decision support system is supposed to analyze multiple risk problems at local and 
regional scales. Its main objectives are: 
 
x To provide a basis for planning in an area prone to multiple risks related to natural 
hazards. 
x To include assessments of exposure and vulnerability. 
x To support planners in understanding the implications of uncertainties and probabilities 
when making decisions concerning land use and for the location of strategic facilities. 
 
The DSS developed during the ARMONIA project represents a qualitative approach using 
risk matrices to derive risk indicators which could be compared under different scenarios 
for a given hazard. Different scenarios for different hazard vulnerability mitigation 
measures can then be compared using a hazard category. The DSS includes the main 
stages of risk assessment: 
 
x Context development 
x Map and scenario selection 
x Hazard analysis 
x Exposed element analysis 
x Vulnerability analysis 
x Multiple criteria risk evaluation 
x Risk assessment results (Output) 
x Risk result comparisons among different scenarios 
                                                 
1
 www.fema.gov/plan/prevent/hazus/ 
2
 www.ortis-info.at/ 
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Work package 5 of the ARMONIA project, (functional and technical architecture design of 
a decision support system for risk in form of special planning) contains a non-
comprehensive list of other software-based DSS.  
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4 The (European) Risk Assessment Process  
 
The current approach of the European Commission to Risk Assessment at the state level 
LVGRFXPHQWHG LQ WKH ³Commission Staff Working Paper. Risk Assessment and Mapping 
Guidelines for Disaster Management, Brussels, 21.12.2010, SEC (ILQDO´ 
 
The following is summarized from this document. 
 
Scope and Definitions: 
 
National risk assessments include risks which are of sufficient severity to entail 
involvement by national governments in the response, in particular via civil protection 
services. Several countries have already produced national risk assessments or carried 
out substantive work in the area, in particular, UK, NL, DE, SE, FR, USA, Australia, 
Canada. 
 
Previous Action includes: 
 
x Directive 2007/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 
2007 on the assessment and management of flood risks, OJ L288, 6.11.2007, p.28. 
x Council Directive 2008/114/EC on the identification and designation of European 
critical infrastructures and the assessment of the need to improve their protection, OJ 
L345, 23.12.2008, p.75. 
x Council Directive 96/82/EC on the control of major accident hazards involving 
dangerous substances, OJ L010, 14.01.1997, p. 13. 
 
Role of Risk Assessment and Mapping within Disaster Risk Management:  
 
Risk assessment and mapping are carried out within the broader context of disaster risk 
management. Risk assessment and mapping are the central components of a more 
general process which furthermore identifies the capacities and resources available to 
reduce the identified levels of risk, or the possible effects of a disaster (capacity analysis), 
and considers the planning of appropriate risk mitigation measures (capability planning), 
the monitoring and review of hazards, risks, and vulnerabilities, as well as the consultation 
and communication of findings and results. 
 
Capacity analysis, capability planning, monitoring and review, consultation and 
communication of findings and results are not the subject of these guidelines. However, 
national risk assessments and mapping deliver the essential input for informed capacity 
building and the enhancement of both disaster prevention and preparedness activities. 
 
Risk assessments and risk mapping contribute to ensuring that policy decisions are 
prioritised in ways to address the most severe risks with the most appropriate prevention 
and preparedness measures, and can in the process also become an instrument of 
solidarity. 
 
Risk assessments deal with uncertainty and probabilities. These are the necessary 
subjects of a rational debate about the level of risk a Member State, or even the entire EU, 
may find acceptable when considering the costs of the associated prevention and 
mitigation measures. 
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Risk Matrix: 
 
The risk management process has been standardised in the ISO 31000 standards, 
codified by the International Organization for Standardization (ISO)3. The purpose of ISO 
31000 is to provide principles and generic guidelines on risk management which are 
universally recognized by practitioners, researchers, companies, etc. and that fit existing 
standards, methodologies and paradigms. ISO 31000 was published in November 2009. 
The standard does NOT aim at certification - as other ISO quality assurance guidelines do 
- but rather assuring the consideration of relevant aspects, the proper structure of an 
assessment process, and governance issues. The ISO standards are increasingly 
referenced in the corporate and public sector. 
 
ISO 31000 contains the elements and interactions as identified in Fig. 1. The assessment 
of risk, which is the topic of MATRIX, includes, according to ISO 31000, three steps:  
 
1. Risk identification. 
2. Risk analysis. 
3. Risk evaluation. 
 
 
 
Fig. 1 Risk Management Process according to ISO 31000 (ISO 2009) 
 
A risk matrix relating in two dimensions the likelihood and impact of a risk is a graphical 
representation of different risks in a comparative way (Fig. 2). The matrix is used as a 
visualisation tool when multiple risks have been identified to facilitate the comparison of 
different risks. The political/social impact can be measured using a qualitative scale 
comprising five classes, e.g., (1) limited/ insignificant, (2) minor/ substantial, (3) moderate/ 
serious, (4) significant/ very serious, (5) catastrophic/ disastrous. 
 
                                                 
3
 www.iso.ch 
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Fig. 2 Risk Matrix (based on BBK 2010) 
 
The stages of risk assessment in the overall risk management process may be 
summarized as follows: At the beginning of the risk assessment process, there are three 
main preliminary steps to be made: 1) selecting the same target area (e.g., national); 2) 
selecting the same time window (e.g., short-term); 3) defining the same metric for the risk 
(e.g., impact measures). Once these steps have been made, we can start with the risk 
identification. 
 
Scenarios: 
 
ISO 31010 states that ³0DQ\ ULVN HYHQWV PD\ KDYH D UDQJH RI RXWFRPHV ZLWK GLIIHUHQW
associated probability. Usually, minor problems are more common than catastrophes. 
There is therefore a choice as to whether to rank the most common outcome or the most 
serious or some other combination. In many cases, it is appropriate to focus on the most 
serious credible outcomes as these pose the largest threat and are often of most concern. 
In some cases, it may be appropriate to rank both common problems and unlikely 
catastrophes as separate risks. It is important that the probability relevant to the selected 
consequences is used and not the probDELOLW\RIWKHHYHQWDVDZKROH´,62D 
 
Generally, risk scenarios will be used both in the risk identification phase as well as at the 
risk analysis stage, with the latter aiming to establish quantitative estimates for impacts 
and probabilities. At the stage of risk identification, scenario building must be devised in 
the most inclusive way and may refer to rough estimates or qualitative analysis. At the 
stage of risk analysis, if possible, quantitative probabilities should be estimated for each 
scenario, e.g., using Bayesian methods, i.e., a statistical procedure which utilizes prior 
distribution data to assess the probability of a result. 
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As a matter of necessity, scenario building must be undertaken according to a minimum 
degree of common understanding among stakeholders. It will otherwise be impossible to 
compare the information presented by different Member States and may even lead to a 
distorted overall view. For this purpose, national risk identification would need to consider 
at least all significant hazards of an intensity that would on average occur once or more 
often in 100 years (i.e., all hazards with a annual probability of 1% or more) and for which 
the consequences represent significant potential impacts, i.e., the number of people 
affected being JUHDWHU WKDQ  HFRQRPLF DQG HQYLURQPHQWDO FRVWV DERYH ¼ PLOOLRQ
and the political/social impact considered significant or very serious (level 4). Where the 
likely impacts exceed a threshold of 0.6 % of gross national income (GNI), less likely 
hazards or risk scenarios should also be considered (e.g., volcanic eruptions, tsunamis). 
Where the likelihood of a hazard leading to impacts exceeding the above thresholds is 
more than once in ten years, at least three scenarios with at least three different intensities 
should be included in the assessment. However, the number of necessary scenarios will 
depend on the size of the Member State, the number and extent of existing hazards and 
risks, and the level of advancement of the national risk assessment efforts. Experience 
from Member States indicates that between 50 to 100 scenarios may be necessary for a 
first risk identification exercise. 
 
The ³&RPPLVVLRQ6WDII:RUNLQJ3DSHU´ OLVWVDQXPEHURI(8LQLWLDWLYHVZLWKUHOHYDQFHWR
risk mapping, including EU legislation. They generally aim at the identification of areas of 
risk and the development of information for the public. These initiatives are: 
 
x Floods 
The European Flood Directive requires Member States to identify areas of potential 
significant flood risk, based on a preliminary flood risk assessment which looks at, 
among other things, past floods, effectiveness of man-made flood defence 
infrastructure and long-term developments such as land use and climate change 
where relevant. For such areas, flood hazard and flood risk maps have to be 
prepared, identifying the potential adverse consequences to human health, economic 
activity, cultural heritage and the environment under a set of scenarios. The final step 
is to prepare flood risk management plans, which include flood risk management 
objectives, and the prioritising of measures for achieving these objectives. 
x Droughts 
Droughts are natural disasters which can occur due to long absence of rainfall or due 
to heat waves. The Water Framework Directive deals with the management of scarce 
water resources and drought management, in particular with regards to the mitigation 
of the effects of floods. Member States authorities are required to monitor the 
quantitative status of groundwater and the quality and quantity of surface water (such 
as water flow levels). 
x Industrial accidents 
The Seveso II Directive deals with the presence of dangerous substances in 
establishments. It covers industrial "activities" as well as the storage of dangerous 
chemicals. All operators of establishments coming under the scope of the directive 
need to send a notification to the competent authority and to establish a major 
accident prevention policy. In addition, operators of upper tier establishments need to 
establish a safety report, a safety management system and an emergency plan. 
Member States are obliged to pursue the aim of the directive through controls on the 
locations of new establishments, modifications to existing facilities and new 
developments such as transport links, locations frequented by the public and 
residential areas in the vicinity of existing establishments. In the long term, Land-use 
Planning Policies shall ensure that appropriate distances between hazardous 
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establishments and residential areas are maintained. Operators, as well as public 
authorities, have certain obligations to inform the public as to the nature of these 
establishments 
x European Critical Infrastructures 
Directive 2008/114/EC on the identification and designation of European Critical 
Infrastructures (ECIs) and assessment of the need to improve their protection 
focuses in a first step on the energy sectors (electricity, oil, gas) and transport 
infrastructures. Each designated ECI shall have an Operator Security Plan (OSP) 
covering the identification of important assets, a risk analysis based on major threat 
scenarios, vulnerability of each asset, and the identification, selection and 
prioritisation of countermeasures and procedures. 
 
We do not assess the role of decision making for these cases and topics. 
 
The ³&RPPLVVLRQ6WDII:RUNLQJ3DSHU´DGGUHVVHVH[SOLFLWO\ WKHZD\XQFHUWDLQWLHVVKRXOG
be addressed. As a new aspect for the risk reduction community, it incorporates the 
precautionary principle, which is commonly applied in the evaluation of industrial risks, but 
not systematically used in risk assessment. It can emerge as a supplementary approach to 
the standard probabilistic procedures used so far. 
 
Risk analysis should take into account the uncertainties associated with the analysis of 
risks. Uncertainties need to be understood in order to communicate risk analysis results 
effectively. Uncertainty analysis involves the determination of the variation of imprecision 
in the results, resulting from the collective variation in the parameters and assumptions 
used to define the results. Sources of uncertainty should be identified where possible and 
should address both data and model uncertainties. Parameters to which the analysis is 
sensitive should be identified and stated. 
 
Sensitivity analysis:  
Sensitivity analysis involves the determination of the size and significance of the 
magnitude of risks to changes in individual input parameters. It can help determine 
whether the assumptions underlying a prediction are robust, or whether further information 
needs to be gathered. 
 
The precautionary principle:  
Where the scientific evidence is weak, the precautionary principle can justify the inclusion 
of relevant risks assessed on a qualitative basis, especially when risks to the environment, 
human, animal and plant health are involved and where the consequences are likely to be 
substantial and irreversible, and the likelihood of the occurrence of a negative 
consequence cannot be assessed. The precautionary principle may be applied as a first 
step towards risk management. Temporary decisions may need to be taken on the basis of 
the qualitative or inconclusive evidence. At the same time, any precautionary action must 
be based on objective assessments of the costs and benefits of action and requires 
transparency in decision making. Where the precautionary principle is applied, additional 
efforts should be made to improve the available evidence base. 
 
The ambitious objectives of the European risk mapping process, as documented and 
discussed here, will arise from individual European states based on different timelines and 
with emphasis on different hazards. An overview of the status and progress is currently not 
available. The interaction of MATRIX (WP8 Dissemination) with Civil Protection Agencies 
and other stakeholders through the National Hyogo Framework of Action Platforms aims at 
a better understanding of the boundary conditions and expected progress. The 
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methodology proposed later in this document will be communicated within this context and 
possibly demonstrated in one of the MATRIX case studies. 
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5 The BBK Risk Assessment Methodology  
 
In the following, we briefly describe the methodology of comparative risk assessment, as 
suggested by the Federal Office of Civil Protection and Disaster Assistance (Bundesamt 
für Bevölkerungsschutz und Katastrophenhilfe ± BBK)4 in Germany, the office that is 
responsible for the design of these concepts and their promotion them nationally and 
internationally. BBK understands the procedure outlined in the following as one possible 
way of risk mapping on a national scale. It is important to note that the procedure does 
NOT include a methodology on how to develop scenarios and on how to evaluate the 
severity of losses and consequently how to rank them. We propose that it is at this point 
that decision making should enter the risk assessment process. In order to clarify this, the 
BBK procedure is presented in detail below.  
 
The BBK procedure is called risk matrix analysis and it is consistent with the internationally 
agreed upon standards on risk management (ISO31000 and ISO 31010, 2009). Disasters 
are first identified according to their typology and then characterized with scenarios that 
should cover several return periods. The analysis of the scenarios results in a level of 
severity. The risk matrix is then populated with the set of (frequency, severity) values 
derived from the scenarios. The scales of the risk matrix are essentially logarithmic and 
range in terms of occurrence probability from  
 
1 - very unlikely 
2 - unlikely 
3 - rare 
4 - likely 
5 - very likely. 
 
The severity ranges from  
 
1 - limited 
2 - minor 
3 - moderate 
4 - significant 
5 - catastrophic. 
 
The colour code in Fig. 2 indicates the areas of the risk matrix and the classification of 
risks, ranging from low to medium to high and very high. 
 
 The analysis then proceeds in five steps: 
 
Step 1 - Identification of the spatial area of interest. 
Step 2 - Identify hazards to be included in the risk analysis and develop scenarios. 
Step 3 - Determination of the occurrence probability of scenarios. 
Step 4 - Loss Analysis, 
     - Loss parameters and categories. 
     - Measuring severity, 
Step 5 - Risk Matrix Entry. 
 
 
 
                                                 
4
 www..bbk.bund.de/EN/Home 
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Step 1: Spatial Scale of Analysis 
 
The first step of the risk analysis consists in the identification of the spatial area for which 
the analysis will be done. The area should be precisely described including: 
 
x General geography of the area (e.g., climate, land use). 
x Population (number of people living, population density). 
x Environment (e.g. protected areas). 
x Economy (e.g. economic parameters, level of unemployment, tax income, etc.). 
x Infrastructure (main infrastructures specifically energy, transportation, water supply)., 
 
Map information, including infrastructure information should be available in a format 
appropriate for a GIS. 
 
Step 2: Selection of Hazards ± Development of Scenarios 
 
The second step in the risk analysis identifies which hazards are to be included in the risk 
analysis. Once a specific hazard is identified it is necessary to develop a scenario as a 
basis for the risk analysis. A scenario must describe and document the considered event 
in enough details in order to allow the determination of probabilities and severity of its 
impact. The following parameters for a scenario must be considered: 
 
x Hazard: Which event is under consideration? 
x Site of occurrence: Where is the event occurring? 
x Spatial extent: What extent is affected by the event? 
x Intensity: How strong is the event? 
x Event time: When does the event happen (season, day of time, etc.)? 
x Duration: What is the duration of the event and its direct implications? 
x Cause of the event: What circumstances cause the event? 
x Course of the event: What is the development of the event? 
x Warning time: Was the event expected? Could the population be prepared for it? Could 
the institutions and other players of risk management be prepared? 
x Who and what is affected: Who and what is directly or indirectly affected by the event 
(people, objects, environment, etc.)? Here, a list of items to be protected should be 
provided, rather than statements of potential loss and damage. 
x Reference events: Are there comparable events documented in the area of analysis or 
comparable areas?  
x Further information: What is the level of preparedness of the responsible authorities, 
emergency services, and the general population? Information is required on the 
vulnerability and preparedness of the affected people, environment, assets, etc. 
 
BBK employs as examples for scenarios the following: 
 
x A hundred-year flood as an event with a regular return period 
x A thousand-year flood as an extremely rare event 
x An earthquake with a given magnitude that refers to standard safety considerations 
(475 return period) 
x The release of a certain amount of toxic material. 
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Step 3: Probabilities of occurrence 
 
The third step in the risk analysis is the determination of the occurrence probability of the 
previously identified scenarios. For classification purposes, the occurrence probability is 
scaled into 5 categories, referring to the risk matrix classification. The following identifies 
the category of occurrence probability, its classification, its annual frequency and its return 
period. 
 
1 - very unlikely (occurs once in 100.000 years, has an annual exceedance probability of 
 0,00001) 
2 - unlikely (occurs once in 10.000 years, has an annual exceedance probability of 0,0001) 
3 - rare (occurs once in 1.000 years, annual exceedance rate is 0,001) 
4 - likely (occurs once in 100 years, annual exceedance probability is 0,01) 
5 - very likely (occurs once in 10 years, annual exceedance probability is 0,1). 
 
It is important to know that the return periods and exceedance probabilities per year are 
statistical values. The concept behind this is the availability of an extremely long time 
series of events (millions of years essentially), from which the average return period may 
be determined. The return period does not necessarily mean that this time passes 
between one event and the next of the same magnitude. It only says that two events, 
which are temporarily separated by considerably less or considerably more than the return 
period are unlikely.  
 
For many hazards, these return periods are routinely determined by the standard 
assessment methods. For other hazards, one has to rely on expert opinion and/or 
observations in other areas, countries, etc. 
 
Step 4: Loss Analysis 
 
To specify loss parameters, one has to identify first the sectors that are relevant for the risk 
analysis. Implications for different sectors and objects to be protected need to be 
analysed. In order to determine the extent of damage, a suitable loss parameter has to be 
identified, as outlined in Table 1. It is assumed that all losses are positive in sign, which is 
always the case with direct losses, but could be different with indirect losses. 
 
Table 1  Loss parameters and categories. 
 
Category Abbreviation 
(subcatagory) 
Loss parameter Description Unit 
 
People 
P1 Fatalities Persons that die in the scenario 
within the area of analysis 
number 
P2 Casualties Persons who are injured in the area 
of analysis by the event or as a 
consequence of the event, to the 
extent that they need medical 
treatment. Here also, long term 
effects on health should be 
considered, but specifically 
identified. 
number 
P3 Persons who need 
assistance for 
more than 2 
weeks 
Persons who need e.g., shelter, 
psychological help, or other 
measures of support that need to 
be provided by public or other 
institutions for more than 2 weeks. 
number 
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P4 People who need 
assistance up to 2 
weeks 
Persons who need shelter, 
psychological care or other support 
measures for less than 2 weeks. 
number 
 
Environ-
ment 
E1 Damage to 
environmental 
protected areas 
Identification of protected areas, 
reservations, parks, etc., affected 
by the event. 
hectare 
E2 Damage to the 
fluvial 
environment 
Documentation of damage to river 
systems, lakes or coastal 
environments. 
kilometer 
or hectare 
E3 Damage to ground 
water 
Contamination of ground water hectare 
E4 Damage to 
agricultural areas 
Which areas utilized for agricultural 
production are affected and suffer 
losses. 
hectare 
 
Economy 
F1 Direct losses The total value of direct loss 
measured in the amount of 
resources necessary for 
reconstruction and rehabilitation. 
Euro 
F2 Indirect losses Total amount of indirect losses 
such as interruption of supply 
chains, store of production because 
of this, unemployment, etc. 
Euro 
F3 Loss of economic 
power 
Long-term loss of economic 
production capacity as a 
consequence of the event. 
Euro 
F4 Loss of 
commercial and 
industrial earning 
power 
Loss of tax revenues as a 
consequence of the event. 
Euro 
 
Infra- 
structure 
I1 Interruption of 
fresh water supply 
Duration and spatial extent of the 
interruption, number of affected 
persons and households. 
hours, 
area, 
number  
I2 Interruption of 
energy supply 
Duration and spatial extent of the 
interruption, number of affected 
people and households. 
hours, 
area, 
number 
I3 Interruption of gas 
supply 
Duration and spatial extent of the 
interruption, number of affected 
people and households. 
hours, 
area, 
number 
I4 Interruption of 
tele-
communication 
Duration and spatial extent of the 
interruption; number of affected 
people and households. 
hours, 
area, 
number 
 
Intan- 
gibles 
J1 Implications for 
public security 
Extent of the impact on public 
security (public protests, vandalism, 
violence). 
extent 
J2 Political 
implications 
Extent of implications in the political 
administrative sector (e.g., 
demands for public action, political 
changes). 
extent 
J3 Psychological 
implications 
Extent of loss of trust in public and 
other institutions, such as the 
government, public administration, 
etc. 
extent 
J4 Loss to cultural 
values 
Loss of and damage to cultural and 
religious buildings, sites, values. 
number of 
items, 
degree of 
loss 
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Developing score values for parameters: 
 
The parameters of loss are often not comparable, as they cannot be expressed in one unit, 
for instance a monetary value. Instead, one characterizes the different loss parameters in 
terms of 5 categories: 
 
1 - Irrelevant 
2 - Small 
3 - Moderate 
4 - Large 
5 - Catastrophic 
 
Doing this requires the mapping (or normalization) of individual descriptions of losses into 
the scores. This requires stakeholder input and systematic and transparent evaluation and 
documentation using a DM. As only partial regulations are available in most countries for 
the appropriate identification, it is therefore necessary to develop the classification using a 
stakeholder and consensus driven approach. For instance, with regards to the sector 
'people', one has to determine what numbers of fatalities, casualties; people in need of 
support could be appropriately classified into the above categories. 
 
Overall severity of scenario loss: 
 
The combination of the individual loss categories results in the overall severity of this 
scenario event. The overall loss category can be determined by various procedures must 
be selected by the involved participants of the risk analysis. The simplest way is to add the 
individual loss values and divide them by the number of loss parameters. A more 
sophisticated approach is to include weights for particular parameters of higher relevance 
than others. Again, stakeholder input and a DM is required for this step. 
 
Step 5: Determination and visualisation of risk 
 
The final results for a particular scenario can be inserted into the risk matrix at the 
appropriate location, determined by the severity or loss and the occurrence probability.  
 
This should be done for the entire list of hazards of interest. For a particular hazard type, 
one can choose several scenarios, ranging typically from the regulatory one (e.g., 100-
year flood) to the extremely rare one (1000-year flood).  
 
In this simple procedure, the uncertainties associated with the risk assessment are not 
considered, representing a serious limitation. 
 
Implications for MATRIX 
 
Obviously, the BBK methodology outlined above does not explicitly address the following 
highly relevant issues for the design of risk matrices for a given country. 
 
x It is not explicitly explained how the vulnerability of certain elements of risk have to be 
addressed and quantified. In the methodology this is apparently unnecessary, as the 
risk matrix is essentially filled with a smaller or larger set of scenarios for each type of 
risk. Each scenario should be identified by a return period which allows its 
characterization in terms of frequency of occurrence. 
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x The development of scenarios are coarsely described, but are not systematically 
addressed. Recent literature on this topic can be found in Scholz & Tietje (2002). 
x Scenarios have to identify the impact on society (the potential losses) in a structured 
way (population, economy, ecology, infrastructure, intangible losses). These losses are 
not exclusively expressible in monetary terms, but rather in descriptive parameters. A 
methodology is needed to identify the weights with which the impact of particular 
components in the overall picture are specified. This procedure is not provided by the 
BBK methodology and remains an open question. 
x The uncertainties of losses given a specific level of hazard are not addressed. 
 
In this report we suggest a solution for the third issue raised above, that is the ranking of 
potential losses within the framework of a scoring scheme requires decisions about the 
relative relevance of a particular loss (for instance, reduced hospital capacity after an 
earthquake), as well as the comparison of different loss components. How should the loss 
of 30% hospital beds in an earthquake scenario be weighted: - minor, moderate, 
significant, catastrophic? How would this loss compare with the loss of the fresh water 
supply for 2 weeks for several communities? As a general scheme in addressing these 
questions, we refer to the multi-decision analysis framework sketched in the following 
chapter and propose a specific procedure in chapter 7. 
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6 Multi-Criteria Decision Analysis  
 
7KH IROORZLQJFKDSWHU LVH[FHUSWHGDQGVXPPDUL]HG IURP9DOHQWLQ%HUWVFK¶V3K' 
thesis on Multi-Criteria Decision Analysis (MCDA) and Multi-Attribute Decision Making 
(MADM). MADM appears in several forms, the most relevant for our purposes being the 
Multi-Attribute Value Theory (MAVT), which assumes that the underlying data of the 
decision analysis are deterministic. This contrasts with Multi-Attribute Utility Theory 
(MAUT) which provides a formal framework for the modelling and handling of 
uncertainties. This formal approach comes at the price of a significantly higher level of 
complexity and the associated limitations in its practical application.  
 
In terms of its practical application, MADM is marked by various characteristics which can 
be classified as follows: 
 
x Number of decision makers. 
x Presence of a moderator/facilitator. 
x Underlying data (deterministic, probabilistic); in addition, model uncertainties play a 
relevant role (French & Niculae 2005). 
x Timeframe of a decision. 
Decisions may be operational, technical or strategic, referring to different time scales 
that may vary between hours, days and years. Within the disaster risk management 
context, the problems we address are usually static. Therefore, a sequence of 
characteristics and decisions can be used without considering their temporal variability.  
 
Multi-Attribute Value Theory (MAVT): 
 
As stated before, it is assumed that the preferable decision is to be chosen from a discrete 
set of different alternatives. MAVT is the analytic approach to support decision makers in 
finding a solution to a multi-criteria decision problem by means of defining an attribute tree 
(= a hierarchy of criteria) and the elicitation of the relative importance of the criteria within 
the tree (Geldermann et al. 2009). In the attribute tree the overall goal is hierarchically 
structured into lower level objectives (criteria) and on the lowest level ± measurable 
attributes.  
 
The crucial interactive steps in a MAVT-analysis include: 
1. The structuring of the problem in an attribute tree. 
2. The elicitation of the relative importance of criteria. 
3. The aggregation of the information to obtain a ranking of the considered additional 
alternatives. 
The appropriate formulation of the problem represents the first step in solving it (Belton & 
Stewart 2002). Problem structuring at this step gives an improved understanding of the 
problem itself and the values and criteria that affect a decision. Problem structuring 
includes the identification and specification of objectives (criteria), attributes, and decision 
alternatives. These elements have to be structured in a hierarchical model of criteria.  
 
This structuring process can be handled by a top-down or a bottom-up approach. In 
disaster risk assessment the structure is basically clear and not a matter of stakeholder 
interpretation. Thus, a top-down approach relying on the classical structure of risk 
assessment is the rational and preferable method. The structuring of objectives should be 
clear and hierarchical (lower-level objectives versus higher-level objectives); they should 
be exhaustive and non-redundant, but cover the essential items.  
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Each objective is associated with several attributes that in turn lead to various alternatives. 
The entire attribute tree should be compliant with the following criteria (Keeney & Raiffa 
1976): 
 
x Completeness 
All relevant objectives should be included and the set of attributes completely defines 
the degree to which the overall objective is achieved. 
x Operationality 
Attributes should be meaningful and assessable. 
x Decomposability 
Attributes should be independent that is it should be possible to analyse one attribute 
at a time. 
x Non-redundancy 
 The set of attributes should be non-redundant in order to avoid double counting of 
consequences. 
x Minimum size 
The set of attributes should be as small as possible to ease handling. 
 
Preference elicitation: 
 
After structuring a MADM problem into an attribute tree, it is necessary to construct a 
model that represents the preferences and value judgements of the decision makers. Such 
a preference model essentially consists of two components (Belton & Stewart 2002, 
French 2000): 
 
1. A model that rates each alternative against each individual attribute, enabling the 
comparison of different attributes on a common scale. 
2. A model that allows comparisons amongst the different criteria, which in a 
subsequent step enables an overall ranking of the alternatives to be obtained. 
 
Thus, before the alternatives can be compared to each other with respect to more than 
one attribute at the same time, all scores need to be mapped through a common scale 
ranging from 0 to 1 by utilizing a value function. This value function can have several 
forms, such as a linear function, an exponential function or a continuously increasing 
function (Bertsch 2008). 
 
The determination of the form of the value function is important and forms different from 
the linear one must be considered if the differences between the outcomes of the 
alternatives are significant.  
 
The second component of the preference model refers to the elicitation of the relative 
importance between the criteria, and thus evaluates the objectives. As all criteria will play 
a role, this evaluation is done by weights which are defined such that their sum is equal for 
all objectives. There are several ways to develop this weighting scheme (Edwards & 
Barron 1994, Barron & Barret 1996). A particularly attractive approach is the Analytic 
Hierarchy Process (AHP) (Saaty 1980) which provides a fixed pair-wise comparison 
procedure which includes redundancy and thus allows the estimation of the consistency of 
the process. 
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Aggregation: 
 
The elicitation and modelling of preferential information is followed by aggregating the 
performance scores with respect to the individual criteria or attributes to an overall 
performance score taking into account the dates and the value functions. The most 
common procedure for this is the additives aggregation rule, which evaluates the overall 
value function by summing the individual value functions with the respective weights. The 
advantage of this form is that it is easily explained and understood by decision makers.  
 
Sensitivity analysis: 
 
Sensitivity analysis plays an important role in decision making, because the preference 
parameters in a MAVT analysis are always subjective. The basic process involves varying 
the preference parameters over appropriate ranges, which will then show how sensitive 
the overall outcome is to particular parameters. In addition to a sensitivity analysis that 
relates the performance score to a variation of preferential parameters spider diagrams are 
typically used for the visual comparison of several alternatives with respect to the different 
criteria (Vetschera 1994). A spider diagram thus provides a realistic overall impression of 
the key parameters that influence the decision problem. 
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7 Loss Index Indicators (LII)  
 
As indicated at the end of chapter 5 we propose a decision making methodology for 
ranking and scoring of losses in the context of risk mapping following the risk matrix 
approach. Ranking of potential losses within the framework of a scoring scheme requires 
decisions on the relative importance of a particular loss (for instance, reduced hospital 
capacity after an earthquake) as well as the comparison of different loss components. In 
this chapter, we describe elements of a methodology that addresses the risk matrix 
decision approach in a coherent and transparent way. The required decisions have been 
discussed in the previous chapters and are summarized in Fig. 3. 
 
The methodology builds on what was originally developed for the Inter-American 
Development Bank (IADB) and is called the indicator program. This program is supposed 
to develop sets of indicators for disaster risk assessment and management. (Cardona 
2004, Carreno et al. 2005). One of the indices, the urban disaster risk indicator (UDRI), 
identifies a scale factor (called the aggravating factor by Cardona, 2004) for the estimated 
(usually in monetary terms) physical risk. This factor results from mostly social 
vulnerabilities that are difficult to quantify in financial terms. This method, specifically the 
development of indicators in stakeholder processes, can capitalise on the ample 
experience available from a variety of cities and regions of the world (EMI 2009, 
Fernandez et al. 2006, Khazai et al. 2009). 
 
 
 
Fig. 3 Decisions incorporated into the risk matrix approach to multi-risk 
assessment; AHP: Analytic Hierarchy Process, Saaty (1980); LDW: Logical 
Decisions for Windows Software (http://www.logicaldecisions.com). 
 
The main difference of the adapted LII methodology to the classical indicator approach is 
that we use indicators for all loss components, irrespective of whether the loss is physical 
or not, or whether it can be expressed in financial terms or not. Instead of indicators, we 
call them score-values for various loss parameters. 
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Comparable to the Cardona (2004) approach, we structure the process into four steps: 
 
(1) Selection of loss parameters 
This represents the precise definition and selection of loss components and the 
parameters with which the loss is expressed for a particular scenario. In the BBK 
methodology, this includes five major groups of loss types and four subgroups for 
each of the main types. It is obvious that it can also refer to any other structure of 
losses. It is mandatory, however, that the set of indicators, and therefore the set of 
loss components, be comprehensive, non-overlapping, non-redundant, can be clearly 
described and evaluated, and follows clear definitions and understanding within the 
stakeholder group. 
 
(2)  Normalisation 
As for each loss component, the parameter with which the loss is expressed varies. 
That is, it is necessary to map this parameter to a score-value, e.g. a normalized 
range between 1 and 5. This step is called normalisation. It essentially consists of the 
identification and establishment of a function that relates the parameter of loss to the 
normalized value of the score-value. This function can be linear or non-linear and its 
selection plays a quite important role. For instance, if the impact of the loss is 
considered to be fairly linear with regard to the loss parameter, a linear normalisation 
function would be appropriate. However, in other cases, non-linear functions, for 
instance exponential functions, must be chosen.  
 
(3)  Aggregation 
In this step the categories and the score-values within the categories are combined 
with weights to be chosen by a group of stakeholders in a rational way.  
 
(4)  Sensitivity analysis 
Due to the difficulty in operationalizing all dimensions of vulnerability (i.e., some 
dimensions cannot be measured) and the uncertainties in the underlying data, the 
results might also be affected by different sources of uncertainty. This also applies to 
the intra-model uncertainties associated with the weighting process and the 
implementation of transformation functions. In addition, the uncertainties contained 
within the input-data may be substantial. Therefore, in order to analyse the 
robustness of the methodology, a sensitivity analysis which demonstrates the 
variability in the results should be conducted as a final step.  
 
Normalization enables the integration of quantitative and qualitative loss parameters within 
the same framework. In order for the loss parameters to be commensurate, transformation 
functions are used to normalize the values of loss parameters into score-values from 1 to 
5. The transformation describes the intensity of risk for each one of the score-values. 
Here, 1 stands for a low loss and 5 for a catastrophic loss. The definition of maximum and 
minimum values of the loss parameter is important. For the normalization process a multi-
criteria decision support software called Logical Decisions for Windows (LDW) facilitates 
the selection of transformation functions and the calculation of standardized indicator 
values. LDW uses two types of transformation functions: linear and exponential. The 
software allows the user to interactively define maximum and minimum ranges, as well as 
change the shape of the transformation function. 
 
In the aggregation step, the overall score-value is calculated by aggregating the values of 
the weighted loss categories and loss parameters. An especially important aspect for the 
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quality of results of the integrated indicator system is marked by the assignment of weights 
for the individual indicators. In the following, N refers to the category of loss: Population 
(P), Economy (E), Ecology (F), Infrastructure (I) and Intangibles (J): 
 
^ `JIFEPN ,,,,  
 
Within each category there are several loss parameters (in the BBK case, always 4), the 
number of which is in general denoted as KN. Each of them has a score-value attached by 
the normalization process of N
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parameter to the score of this category NS
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In a second step, the scores of the loss categories N are combined by a additional set of 
weights, defined in the following and determined in a stakeholder assessment approach: 
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Value S is then inserted into the risk matrix.  
 
As an example, we assume an earthquake scenario and consider the loss category 4 N  
(infrastructure) that is, according to Table 1, characterized by 44  K  loss parameters 
(fresh water, energy, gas, communication). A stakeholder analysis of the losses of this 
particular scenario provided the 4 scoring values (ranging between 1 and 5) as shown in 
Table 2, which also explains the rationale for choosing the scores. As the severity of the 
four infrastructure losses are not equal, different weights are attached, ranking the loss of 
energy as most severe, about 5 time more relevant than loss of public communication and 
2.5 times more important than fresh water or gas supply. 
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Table 2   Example of scores and weights generated by stakeholders for the loss 
parameter µinfrastructure¶. 
 
Loss parameter Parameter-
index 
Score 
between 1 and 5 
Reason for score Weight of loss 
parameter 
(stakeholder) 
Fresh water 1 241  s  Little damage, 
restoration within 24 
hours. 
20% 
Energy 2 442  s  Several GW knocked 
out, blackout for 
several days. 
50% 
Gas 3 243  s  Little damage, 
restoration within 24 
hours. 
20% 
Communication 4 144  s  Excess demand for 
communication but 
only minor (hours) 
disruptions. 
10% 
 
Without (stakeholder defined) weights, each parameter would be equally weighted with 
0.25 and result in: 
 
25.2125.0225.0425.0225.04   S  
 
With (stakeholder defined) weights the score for category 4 losses would be much higher 
as the loss of energy supply is considered as very relevant: 
 
90.2110.0220.0450.0220.04   S  
 
We now assume that for the earthquake scenario, the other 4 loss categories have been 
analyzed and are assigned with a category score value, as shown in Table 3. The 5 loss 
categories are generally not of equal importance and could be ranked using weights. For 
instance, the human losses have the highest weight; about 5 times higher than economic 
losses and 10 times higher than environmental losses, whereas infrastructure losses also 
qualify fairly highly (see Table 3, where the rational for weights is briefly stated). 
 
Table 3   Example of category scores and category weights. 
 
Loss 
category 
Loss 
category 
index 
Category 
score value  
Category 
weight  
Reason for category 
weight  
People 1 5.11  S  %501  W  Highest constitutional 
value 
Economy 2 9.22  S  %102  W  Not extremely relevant as 
always small compared to 
GDP 
Environment 3 8.13  S  %53  W  Small influence attributed 
Infrastructure 4 9.24  S  %304  W  High relevance for impact 
and reconstruction 
Intangibles 5 0.21  S  %55  W  Small influence attributed 
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Without (stakeholder defined) category weights, the overall score would be: 
 
22.20.220.09.220.08.120.09.220.05.120.0   S  
 
With (stakeholder defined) category weights, which includes the high rankings for people 
and infrastructure, the overall score would be: 
 
10.20.25.0.09.230.08.105.09.210.05.150.0   S  
 
As the LDW software uses hierarchies to organize the indicators and sub-indicators, it is 
possible to visualize the rankings at the highest level (e.g., the ranking of impacts from all 
the participating hazard scenarios) or at the lowest level (e.g., the ranking of losses for 
different population loss indicators for one hazard scenario).  
 
Several weight assignment methods are available in the LDW tool which can be used 
interactively with stakeholders to validate the weights assigned to the indicators. In 
particular, the Analytical Hierarchy Process (AHP) provides a robust method for weight 
assignment, as weights are not defined explicitly, but computed from a matrix of pair wise 
comparisons. The AHP process asks the user to enter more performance ratios than are 
strictly necessary to compute a set of weights. Because of this, performance ratios are 
likely to be inconsistent. To provide guidance on the consistency of weight assignments by 
a user, the developers of the AHP method suggest using a statistic called the Consistency 
Ratio (C.R.). The C.R. compares the matrix to a random matrix of the same size. The 
higher the C.R. the more inconsistent the weight assignments are. The developers of AHP 
suggest that if the C.R. for a matrix is greater than 0.1, the user should adjust ratios to 
make them more consistent. Two intermediate statistics are used to compute the C.R. The 
first is called the Lambda-Max (l-max), and is the principal Eigen value of the AHP matrix. 
l-max is the matrix product of the AHP matrix and the vector of the (unadjusted) weights or 
utilities for the matrix. The second intermediate statistic is called the Consistency Index 
(C.I.), which is an absolute measure of consistency and can be computed from l-max. 
 
Another objective in the data analysis phase is to investigate the sensitivity and stability of 
the various indicators according to the input data, their related weights and transformation 
functions. Once the importance weights are evaluated, the analysis will look into what 
subset of factors account for most of the total output variance and pinpoint the non-
important factors of the local data. The shape of transformation functions and their effect 
on the total output variance should be evaluated. The loss parameters should be analysed 
in terms of their interactions, correlations and causal relationships. This aims not primarily 
to reduce the number of loss parameters, but at the optimization of relevant risk 
information input by stakeholders. 
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8 Summary  
 
MATRIX aims to develop new methodologies for multi-risk assessment for natural 
disasters. At the same time a political/administrative process has been launched at the 
EU-level aiming at the harmonization of national risk assessment schemes within Europe 
(Commission Staff Working Paper. Risk Assessment and Mapping Guidelines for Disaster 
Management, Brussels, 21.12.2010, SEC (2010) 1626 final) that relies on the classical risk 
matrix approach. This approach has been developed into a formal methodology, for 
instance by the Federal Office of Civil Protection and Disaster Assistance (Bundesamt für 
Bevölkerungsschutz und Katastrophenhilfe ± BBK) in Germany as a model, which will be 
further developed and applied to German risk assessment. This type of risk assessment 
essentially relies on the development of a risk matrix for different risk types in terms of 
frequency and severity by the design of many scenarios. 
 
It is the intention of this paper to (a) review ± in a general sense ± decision models, but 
more importantly to analyse how the risk matrix approach ± in the specific form of the BBK 
methodology ± can benefit from recently developed decision methods (DM). The essential 
methodological components of the multi-risk assessment process in Europe, on national 
VFDOHDUHGHILQHGLQWKH&RPPLVVLRQ6WDII:RUNLQJ3DSHU³5LVN$VVHVVPHQWDQG0DSSLQJ
*XLGHOLQH IRU 'LVDVWHU 0DQDJHPHQW´ 7KLV PHWKRGRORJ\ LQFOXGHV D VSHFLILF VHW RI ORVV
components (population, economy, ecology, infrastructure, intangibles) with four 
subgroups to each main component, based on the decision model of the multi-attribute 
value theory (MAVT).  
 
Rather than finding a selection process for the best decision, the methodology builds on 
the experience developed with the disaster risk indices originally designed by Cardona 
(2004), and widely applied to various cities and administrative units around the world. 
From a theoretical line of thought and practical experience, we have designed a decision 
model for multi-risk assessment, predominantly designed for the national scale, as 
anticipated in the European process. However, this procedure can be easily utilized for 
different scales, such as communities, regional entities, cities, etc., as long as the risk 
assessment approach as favoured here is utilized.  
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